Involuntary returns from Libya and reintegration in Ghana

Cover photo from GBC Website

Leander Kandilige and Geraldine Asiwome Adiku

Existing literature on return migration tends to focus on voluntary return and the potential developmental implications of such returns. However, a silent but key dimension of return migration are the involuntary returns that mostly result from administrative or judicial Acts. These Acts refer to the enforcement of immigration control measures by destination countries. Another less examined phenomenon is involuntary mass returns from countries in crisis situations such as political, social, economic and natural disasters and the role of collective action by multiple stakeholders in shaping the reintegration outcomes of unplanned returnees. Relying on findings from our empirical study on the experiences of Ghanaian migrants forcibly returned during the political crisis in Libya in 2011, this blog post highlights the key challenges that diverse stakeholders faced in coordinating migrants’ safe return and reintegration.

Most discourses on return migration place a lot of weight on the individual migrant’s own return preparedness as a measure of how likely they are to reintegrate successfully. However, we argue that an institutional approach to explaining return migration is equally important as it allows for an analysis of social and contextual issues at the origin that can impact negatively on return outcomes. IOM, for instance, implements programmes such as the Joint Initiative on Migrant Protection and Reintegration to safeguard the rights of trapped migrants in Libya as well as support their reintegration upon return. The over 35,000 beneficiaries of this initiative since 2017 have included trapped Ghanaian migrants.

We proceed by considering the roles of state agencies, community leaders and civil society organisations, intergovernmental organisations, and families in these return processes, before concluding with some reflections on policy implications.

The role of state agencies

During the evacuation of Ghanaian nationals from Libya in 2011, the Ghanaian state was ultimately responsible for their safe extraction and their reintegration upon return. Efforts began in February 2011 to evacuate trapped Ghanaian migrants. On March 22, 2011, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration reported that 16,822 Ghanaians had been evacuated from Libya. However, the Ghanaian authorities did not have any clear policy and institutional framework for evacuation from conflict situations. This lack of guidance triggered a chaotic and delayed response to the needs of trapped migrants. Belated attempts at securing logistical support from intergovernmental organisations such as IOM and UNHCR resulted in the exposure of migrants to traumatic experiences, physical assaults and even death in a limited number of cases. The Ghanaian embassy in Libya lacked financial and logistical resources to support displaced nationals, leading to a weakening of trust relations between trapped migrants and embassy staff. Furthermore, the mandate of the national agency responsible for managing emergencies (NADMO) was limited to events within the national territory thus rendering it unable to intervene until migrants arrived on Ghanaian soil. Upon arrival, logistical challenges constrained the agency’s ability to carry out thorough assessments of returnees against the effects of trauma and the delivery of therapies for psychosocial and post-traumatic stress disorders.

The role of community leaders and Civil Society Organisations

Photo by supriyaam on Flickr

Beyond the state, community leaders and Civil Society Organisations were instrumental in facilitating return and reintegration processes for involuntary returnees. By means of community radio broadcasts, community leaders created a platform for trapped migrants to directly lobby their elected officials at home to galvanise support for emergency evacuation flights out of Libya. The same medium was used in sensitising community members to the circumstances surrounding the unplanned return of their relatives. This proactive step helped minimise incidents of rejection, feelings of humiliation and possible tensions between community members and returnees. In addition, health screening, humanitarian relief and access to subsidised primary education for the involuntarily returned migrants were all secured through acts of solidarity championed by community leaders and civil society organisations.

The role of intergovernmental organisations

IOM played a key role in supporting the transportation of migrants to safe border crossings in Libya as part of the evacuation process. In Ghana, IOM also provided reintegration support in the form of agricultural tools and equipment, training in basic business management and financial literacy, the formation of returnee associations to bolster chances of attracting credit from financial institutions and extension of psychosocial counselling to returnees. We found that a critical challenge faced was the lack of reliable data on the Ghanaian migrant stock in Libya and the likely number of returnees to plan for during the crisis. ‘Guestimates’ provided by national agencies and the Embassy in Libya frustrated intergovernmental agencies’ ability to effectively support reintegration efforts. 

The role of families

While migrant households left behind tend to benefit directly from remittances, they equally endure the burden of hosting and providing for forcibly returned migrants. Unplanned returns abruptly sever funding lifelines to migrant households, leading to loss of social standing and respectability. In addition, households face the challenge of caring for mentally and emotionally distressed returnees, sharing limited family resources with persons who no longer generate an income, and coping with the stigma associated with a ‘failure of return’. Despite their vulnerabilities, family members are essential stakeholders in the reintegration process.

While migrant households left behind tend to benefit directly from remittances, they equally endure the burden of hosting and providing for forcibly returned migrants

They provided accommodation to returnees, especially those who had lost all their property as result of the crisis in Libya. Some shared parcels of farmlands with returnees as a means of earning a livelihood. Family members also negotiated relations between returnees and community members in order to reduce incidents of stigmatisation.

Photo by Guerric on Flickr

Policy implications

The key challenges that diverse stakeholders faced in coordinating Ghanaian migrants’ safe return and reintegration include the lack of clear evacuation policy, weak institutional frameworks, and a lack of data on the migrants in need of evacuation, which left them ill-prepared for the extraction of Ghanaians from Libya. These shortcomings have real implications for the return and reintegration of individuals during crisis situations. The mere existence of a policy is not enough: it must be budgeted for; have a clearly delineated mandate assigned to relevant stakeholders; and provide adequate training to facilitate an efficient response. National emergency agencies also need to work closely with security attachés based at missions abroad to coordinate the management of disaster incidents.

We found that families are important stakeholders in return and reintegration situations. As such, migrant families should be supported by intervening agencies during unplanned returns to help cater for returnees who may be considered vulnerable because of the circumstances surrounding their return. In addition to recognising the importance of migrant families for returnee rehabilitation and reintegration, a policy on the provision of emotional, psychosocial and psychological support to involuntary returnees should be mainstreamed into national migration policies.

Moreover, migrant source countries should pre-emptively construct at least one purpose-built reception centre, comprising among other things a reception unit, a psychosocial orientation unit, a temporary camp and offices for medics in order to facilitate the process of screening, profiling and record taking of returnees from countries in crisis in a more humane manner.

When the unexpected occurs in destination countries, and the general safety of migrants is at risk, assistance from origin countries eases migrants’ fears, anxieties, and vulnerabilities in an already dangerous and unsettling situation. Horror stories abound about the torture and mistreatment that migrants are subjected to in Libya. A well-coordinated multi-stakeholder collaboration between the state, non-governmental institutions, intergovernmental organisations, the family and civil society organisations makes it easier to remove people from harm’s way in times of crisis. The main impediments to multi-stakeholder coordination, as the Ghanaian example shows, are the divergent agendas and priorities, which affect resource allocation. A refocusing and coordination of agendas and priorities will ensure that adequate help is presented and received when citizens abroad need it the most.

The main impediments to multi-stakeholder coordination, as the Ghanaian example shows, are the divergent agendas and priorities, which affect resource allocation

As mentioned in the introduction, this blog is based on our paper; Kandilige Leander and Geraldine Adiku (2020). ‘The quagmire of return and reintegration: Challenges to multi-stakeholder co-ordination of involuntary return’. International Migration 58(4) pp. 37-53.

Author Bios

Dr. Leander Kandilige is a Senior Lecturer in Migration Studies at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana. His research interests include migration policy development, theories of migration, migration and development. He is a Country Lead for Ghana on the MIGNEX Project and a Researcher on the MIDEQ Project.

Dr. Geraldine Asiwome Adiku teaches Sociology at the University of Ghana. Her research focuses on migration and development with specific emphasis on remittances and reverse remittance practices.

The IOM and ‘voluntary return’ programmes in Africa

Cover photo by Stefanie Carmichael/UNMEER on Flickr

by Antoine Pécoud

In June 2020, Euronews published a three-part series on African migration to Europe, with a particular focus on the EU-funded projects run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to return migrants to their home country. This is a pressing issue. Even if African migration to Europe remains at relatively low levels, it is regularly described as an ‘invasion’ of European countries. Moreover, Europe’s response to the refugee/migrant crisis in the Euro-Mediterranean region since 2015 sheds light on the tragedies and atrocities associated with the (mis)management of migration, with thousands of migrants from Africa and the Middle East dying at sea, and others suffering major human rights abuses in countries such as Libya.

Photo by Christopher Jahn/IFRC on Flickr

The European strategy is based on the externalization of border control in order to intercept migrants in Africa before they reach Europe. European states thus intervene outside their territory: they cannot rely on their own state apparatus only, but need implementing partners. This has proven beneficial for IOM, an intergovernmental organization founded in 1951, which today has over 400 field offices worldwide.

The project investigated by Euronews provides an illustration of IOM’s role in the externalization of European immigration policy. Entitled the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, it aims to ‘enable migrants who decide to return to their countries of origin to do so in a safe and dignified way’, while also ‘providing assistance to returning migrants to help them restart their lives in their countries of origin’. It is funded to the height of €357 million by the EU and operates in 26 African countries; some 80,000 migrants have been returned so far, mainly from Libya and Niger to sub-Saharan countries like Eritrea, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mali or Sudan.

Such returns are called ‘assisted voluntary returns’ and constitute a pillar of IOM’s work. They target ‘migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in host or transit countries and wish to return voluntarily to their countries of origin’. By avoiding the violence and coercion of forced expulsions, they would fit into what IOM calls ‘humane and orderly migration’. The project further claims to ‘reintegrate’ migrants in their country of origin, by helping them acquire skills, find a job or create a business, and to ‘mitigate some of the drivers of irregular migration’. By combining return with reintegration, IOM intends to operate ‘for the benefit of all’: for receiving states (that want to keep migrants way), for sending states (in need of development) and for migrants themselves (who would benefit from a better situation in their home country).

From narratives to reality

At first sight, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration makes sense. It is sensible to rescue migrants from the hardships of life in Libya and to prevent the tragedies that may occur when they embark to reach Europe. It also seems worthwhile to provide them with skills and professional opportunities in their home country.

But Euronews’ account is quite different. Firstly, while returns did take place, reintegration assistance proved much more elusive, or even non-existent. Whereas IOM is preoccupied with the removal of unwanted migrants, their fate back home seems of less concern. Secondly, returns are labelled ‘voluntary’ but many returned migrants did not see themselves as ‘voluntary’: they were pressured to accept and sometimes received information in languages they did not understand. And thirdly, once returned, migrants felt abandoned – to the extent that many considered re-migrating to Europe.

For instance, in Nigeria, women who had been sexually exploited during their migration journey ended up being sexually exploited again upon their return. In Eritrea, a country with a worrying human rights record, young men who had left without having fulfilled their (forced) military duties found themselves in trouble.

IOM is financially dependent upon a handful of Western migrant-receiving countries. Its projects are therefore donor-driven and prioritise the interests of the Global North in combatting irregular migration

These findings come as no surprise. Julien Brachet documents how IOM in Libya primarily wants to keep migrants from embarking for Europe and is hardly preoccupied with their rights or reintegration. Jill Alpes reaches a similar conclusion, adding that the extent to which returns are ‘voluntary’ depends in reality upon the violence faced by migrants: the greater the hardships in transit countries, the more migrants will prove ‘voluntary’ to return – hence the structural connexion between anti-migrant violence and IOM’s programs. 

To contextualise these findings, it must be recalled that IOM is financially dependent upon a handful of Western migrant-receiving countries. Its projects are therefore donor-driven and prioritise the interests of the Global North in combatting irregular migration. IOM claims to work ‘for the benefit of all’, but its projects are actually ‘for the benefit of some’.

In addition, IOM has an uneasy relationship to human rights. Its constitution makes no reference to rights, which both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch lamented as early as 2002. François Crépeau, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, also writes that ‘the mandate and funding of IOM pose structural problems with regard to fully adopting a human rights framework’. From a rights-based perspective, ‘voluntary’ returns are problematic because they may concern people who deserve refugee protection and are exposed to abuses in their country.

IOM’s response

IOM responded to Euronews’ investigation, putting forward several counter-arguments. First, it claims that its activities cannot be solely in Europe’s interest because they draw upon joint Euro-African agreements, including the Action plan adopted in 2015 at an Euro-African Summit on migration in Valletta (in which one of the five ‘priority domains’ is indeed precisely about ‘return, readmission and reintegration’). Formally, therefore,African governments agree with IOM’s EU-funded activities. This raises two key questions, pertaining to (1) the extent to which African governments reflect their societies’ aspirations, and (2) whether their agreement to such action plans are dependent on broader deals about development, security, etc.

Image from IOM website

Second, IOM emphasizes that since its primary objective consists of helping migrants in distress it should not be criticized for failing to provide long-term solutions, which – it further argues – cannot be achieved without the involvement of local governments, the private sector, or civil society. This is a pragmatic argument, rooted in the humanitarian imperative of saving lives, and quite sensible in the face of migrants’ living conditions in Libya or Niger. Yet, the pitfall with such humanitarian logic is that merely saving lives tends to move (or postpone) the problem, as returned migrants face hardships at home or emigrate again – most likely with the same results, and likely with ‘more of the same’ in terms of policy response and IOM’s activities. Third, IOM reiterates the compatibility of voluntary returns with human rights and even mentions a ‘fundamental right to return’. Finally, it contests Euronews’ evidence, which it finds anecdotal and unrepresentative of the actual situation. This is an important (albeit somewhat ironic) issue, because IOM’s projects are hardly evaluated, whether by IOM itself or by other actors. It is easy to count the numbers of migrants returned to their country, but much more difficult to ascertain whether their reintegration proves successful.

IOM’s mandate and activities in question

While IOM puts forward the need for immediate relief among migrants caught in Libya or Niger, its response actually raises many questions about the long-term effects of its projects and the broader political context in which it operates.  

Photo by IOM/Hamza Osman on Flickr

IOM has turned into a kind of ‘super ministry of migration’ in Africa. In 1991, it only had 43 member-states and a $300 million budget. But in 2020, the number of member-states reached 173 and the budget is estimated at $1.8 billion. This growth is most likely to continue: indeed, in the EU, the proposed 2021-2027 budget foresees the tripling of the funds devoted to migration and border management, with almost €35 billion, and part of this money will undoubtedly go to IOM and to the expansion of its activities in Africa.

Yet, IOM generally manages to escape public scrutiny. Its projects are carried out in countries where independent media and civil society are often fairly weak. IOM also devotes important resources to its communication strategy and maintains good relationships with influential researchers, for instance through its ‘research leaders syndicate’ or its publications, which include the widely-circulated World Migration Reports and an academic journal. As a matter of fact, only a small number of critical researchers and small NGOs scrutinise IOM’s activities.  

This makes for a moral and political dilemma, as the governance of migration ‘for the benefit of all’ is not easily reconciled with Europe’s obsession with combatting irregular migration from Africa

Such scrutiny is necessary for African societies to articulate a more autonomous migration policy strategy. It is also necessary in order for European citizens to know what is being done by the EU in the name of migration management. It is, finally, necessary for the international community at large: IOM joined the UN in 2016 and since then embodies the UN answer to migration challenges.

This makes for a moral and political dilemma, as the governance of migration ‘for the benefit of all’ is not easily reconciled with Europe’s obsession with combatting irregular migration from Africa. Euronews’ investigations therefore constitute a rare and welcome occasion of setting the terms for a broader public debate.

About the author

Antoine Pécoud is Professor of Sociology at the University of Sorbonne Paris Nord. His research focuses on the global governance of migration and the role of intergovernmental organisations in migration politics. His last book is The International Organization for Migration. The New ‘UN Migration Agency’ in Critical Perspective (Palgrave 2020).

Shifting the narrative on African migration

by Jesper Bjarnesen

African migration remains at the top of political agendas across Europe. Through the EU-led focus on addressing the “root causes” of African migration, and the UN-led Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), African migration is increasingly being linked to sustainable development. It has proven difficult, however, to mobilise support for longer-term policy solutions, and the lion’s share of European funding still targets border-control measures and the repatriation of African migrants from Europe. The main challenge facing European decision makers and policy implementers in this regard is not lack of ideas – there are plenty of good policy ideas in the UN GCM, in the EU Agenda on Migration, and in a host of national political agendas. The main stumbling block of these initiatives is the negative public opinion towards African migration, which stems from a fear of unregulated immigration to Europe and a new “refugee crisis”.

By shifting the narrative on African migration, decision makers can redirect political will towards more sustainable and longer-term solutions to the problems relating to irregular migration from Africa. Such a shift would also harness the untapped potential of South–North migration to meet the needs of host countries’ domestic labour markets, while simultaneously serving the interests of migrants and their home communities.

Get the numbers right

Current political debates across Europe tend to be informed by highly selective and sometimes misleading notions of the scale of migration from Africa to Europe. To shift the narrative on African migration, it is important to correct these misconceptions. The overall message in this regard is twofold: that African migration to Europe has been fairly constant over the past decade relative to the total African population, with a significant drop in the number of arrivals across the Mediterranean since 2015; and that most African migrants who enter Europe do so legally.

There are currently around 9 million African-born migrants living in Europe. On average, 400,000 African citizens enter the EU each year, and this number has risen steadily over the past decade in absolute terms. However, the rising figure should not be misinterpreted as an indication that African migrants are becoming increasingly obsessed with leaving the continent. First and foremost, the majority of African international migrants remain on the continent, and most of them never leave their sub region. Secondly, the total percentage of African migrants in relation to the African population has not increased significantly over the past 60 years.

In other words, the growing number of African migrants is not driven by an increased fixation with leaving the continent, but is primarily an effect of population growth. Thirdly, in a global comparison, the proportion of African migrants is quite low. Africa is home to more than 17 per cent of the world population, yet only 15 per cent of the world’s international migrants are born in Africa. Fourthly, the number of African immigrants settling legally in the EU dropped significantly between 2008 and 2012 – from 442,000 to 270,000. Since then, the number has remained more or less stable, with 288,000 legal arrivals in 2016. At the same time, even in the midst of the European refugee crisis, the number of illegal crossings by sub Saharan African nationals using the Mediterranean routes has been relatively stable over the past decade, until the recent drop in the total number of arrivals in 2018, due to the changing strategies of EU externalisation policies.

Taken together, when it comes to African international migrants, the numbers demonstrate that international migration is mainly directed towards the immediate sub-region or other parts of the continent; that the total percentage of African migrants in relation to population has remained remarkably stable over the past generation; and that the proportion of African migrants in relation to the global migrant stock is quite low.

Get the motivations right

If we get the numbers right on African migration, there should also be an opportunity to correct certain basic misconceptions about why some African nationals are so determined to invest their resources – and sometimes to risk their lives – to reach Europe or other parts of the global North. While the political debates surrounding xenophobia and racism have tended to polarise public opinion further, shifting the narrative on African migration could potentially contribute to the setting of a new agenda on national integration in Europe as well. In this regard, it is important to recognise and understand the motivations and contributions of the most stigmatised migrants. Irregular migration is no one’s first choice. People who leave their homes in search of better opportunities would rather do so in the safest way possible.


Fears are often raised that migrants from the global South will become a burden on host societies. Migration, we should remember, is a means to an end. Most migrants are driven by the motivation to work, study or join their families. This means that very few migrants expect to receive financial support from their host societies. And while some African migrants do rely on social services in Europe, the vast majority – whether or not they have migrated legally – do not. They contribute to their host societies not only through their labour, but also by paying taxes, etc.

To challenge the disproportionate attention devoted to the costs and challenges that migrants from the global South place on European host societies, it is important to shift the narrative towards the contributions they make. The money that African migrants make abroad has long been recognised as an important resource for sustainable development in their countries of origin. In 2018, sub-Saharan African migrants in the EU sent back more than 41 billion euros in remittances – almost the equivalent of the EU’s total official development assistance to the region. These figures are independent of employment status, which means that they include money earned by irregular migrants. By retaining ties to their home communities, migrants also contribute through skills and knowledge sharing – so-called “social remittances”.

In public debates across the global North, fears continue to be raised that immigrants will “steal our jobs”. These fears are based on a series of misunderstandings about European labour markets. Contrary to popular assumption, there is a growing demand for mid- to low-skilled labour in Europe. In Denmark, for example, vacancies in the private sector are at their highest since 2010. In the past 10 years, there have been labour shortages in the industrial sector; construction; retail and transportation; information and communication; and finance, insurance and real estate.

Overall, the unemployment rate in Denmark (as in the other Nordic countries) has been falling steadily since 2013; and with an ageing population across Europe, the demand for foreign labour is bound to increase in the future. This demand is not for the most highly skilled specialists (as is often assumed), since the highest educated are already migrating legally, and integrating into European labour markets. One of the main challenges to actively recruiting migrant labour from the global South (apart from public opinion) is the European requirement for language and educational skills. These requirements are intended to enable permanent naturalisation and integration into the host society, as stipulated by standardised citizenship tests. These intentions are clear when one compares what is required of a highly skilled specialist and a low-skilled worker. For example, if an American researcher wishes to settle in Sweden, she is not obliged to complete a mandatory language course before taking up a teaching post at the university. By being more pragmatic over the requirements placed on migrants in terms of the skills they need to fulfil their professional commitments – regardless of the work sector – European migration management could reduce the costs of generic skills and language training; integrate migrants more efficiently into the Labour market; and be more competitive in attracting the migrant labour it needs.

Finally, research on migratory patterns shows that there is a direct connection between migration management and the length of a migrant’s stay abroad. The main lesson from these insights is that the more difficult it is to enter a country, the longer the migrant is likely to stay. In contexts where legal entry is relatively easy – as it is in most African states, and as it was in Europe until the mid-1980s – most migrants prefer to travel more regularly between the home and the host country, and to return to the country of origin sooner. The current circulation of mid- to low-skilled workers between Asia and the Middle East shows that when legal pathways to temporary labour migration are available, most migrants prefer to work on shorter contracts, and then return home.

Get the “root causes” right

European governments are currently investing heavily in combating the so-called “root causes” of African migration to Europe. Their policy is based on the assumption that if living and working conditions in the sending countries are improved, the incentive to migrate will decline. This policy is flawed and politically risky. First of all, even if increased development investments in the main sending regions were to succeed in raising the general standard of living, it is unlikely that the small percentage of African citizens who migrate would significantly change their outlook. Secondly, albeit with some important variations, most experiences have shown that an increase in household income tends to lead to more, not less, migration in the short and medium term. Migration is a costly affair, and is usually not available to the poorest.

The fundamental driver of South–North labour migration is inequality, not poverty

The African continent would have to experience an unprecedented economic uplift for it to reach the so-called “migration hump” (see figure), where increased income begins to lead to less migration. Migration theory has established a generalised understanding of the correlation between income level and migration, which confirms that the highest migration rates occur not at the lowest levels of development (Zone A), but rather at the intermediary level (Zone B), where income levels are still significantly lower than in the host country but high enough to finance the migration endeavour. The same reasoning shows that once a relative income threshold is reached, migration rates tend to decrease with continued rise in income level (Zone C). This model is usually referred to as the “migration hump” because of its inverted U shape. Thirdly, regardless of the potential rise in income levels through targeted development investments, the “root causes” approach fails to recognise that migration has always been about seeking better opportunities elsewhere. This means that so long as income levels and living standards remain as unevenly distributed across the globe as they are today, families and individuals in the world’s poorest regions will find it worth investing in migration. In that sense, the fundamental driver of South–North Labour migration is inequality, not poverty.

Get the alternatives right

The short-term challenges of the current crisis in European migration management will not be met by development investment. Irregular migration into the EU is still a political hot potato that is juggled by heads of state and a panoply of ministries and special appointees at the EU and national level. Development actors have a part to play in these negotiations, but their main role should be to think more long term and holistically about African migration.

Shifting the narrative on African migration away from European immigration politics requires clearer reasoning about the different needs, rights and challenges of aspiring economic migrants, compared to people fleeing war or climate-related disasters. It is important to understand that the vast majority of sub-Saharan African irregular migrants to Europe are aspiring labour migrants, and that their asylum claims are a reflection of the lack of legal options for pursuing labour migration to the EU. By not providing other options, the EU is contributing to irregular migration and the criminalisation of aspiring labour migrants. This does not absolve African states, smugglers, traffickers or the migrants themselves of their share of responsibility for the current European migration management crisis; but in order to construct sustainable solutions, greater consideration must be given to legal pathways for labour migrants with different skills levels.

Conclusion: Get the perspectives right

In short, shifting the narrative on African migration is a prerequisite for getting to grips with inclusive, pragmatic and transparent migration management. Shifting the narrative implies moving public debate from difficult political and moral discussions about Europe’s humanitarian responsibilities towards a more technical and practical discussion of labour migration management. In such a discussion, the needs and requirements of European labour markets, and the accompanying rights of its workers, are more relevant than whether or not Europeans have a moral responsibility towards African migrants.

Shifting the narrative implies moving public debate from difficult political and moral discussions about Europe’s humanitarian responsibilities towards a more technical and practical discussion of labour migration management

This shift would also enable a more straightforward consideration of the human rights of all migrants. The Sustainable Development Goals agenda refers to the legal principle of universal human rights – not to a moral or humanitarian responsibility. On this basis, the current multilateral agendas for migration management already offer a toolbox of more sustainable solutions to global migration management.

Recommended Readings

OECD Migration Data Brief No 5, June 2019
IOM World Migration Report 2020
UN DESA International Migration Report 2019
UNDP “Scaling the Fences. Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe”
PRIO “Is ‘Sustainable Migration’ a Valuable Concept?” 2018

This text was originally published as a Policy Note, by the Nordic Africa Institute, and is republished here with permission. To access the original publication in Pdf, please click here.

About the author

Jesper Bjarnesen is a Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute since September 2013. He has an M.A. in Anthropology and one in African Regional Studies at the University of Copenhagen, and a PhD in Cultural Anthropology at Uppsala University. Bjarnesen has worked primarily on the grey zones between forced and voluntary migration in West Africa, in the
context of the 2002-2011 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. Within this context, his research has considered the generational variations of displacement; the dynamics of integration among urban youths; and the broader themes of urban resettlement and transnational families. His current research focuses, firstly, on the effects of migration governance in terms of the
in/visibilities produced by specific legal statuses and, secondly, on the ‘soft infrastructures’ of labour mobilities across and between secondary cities in West Africa. With Franzisca Zanker, he is the co-founder of the African Migration, Mobility and Displacement (AMMODI) research
network.


Africa at the gates: Europe’s lose-lose migration management plan

Cover photo by Irish Defense Forces.

by Loren B Landau and Iriann Freemantle

Europe has not been this scared of Africans since Hannibal drove his war elephants over the Pyrenees. Since the summer of 2015, the question of how to stem the flows from Africa and the Middle East is at the centre of increasingly existential debates about the very future of Europe. Mobilising the full portfolio of its hard and soft powers, Europe is flexing its enforcement muscle to reach deep into the African continent. Working together with African political elites, the results will be reconfigured politics, norms and conceptions of rights north and south of the Mediterranean. This will worsen Africans’ ability to cope with climate change, economic precarity, and other challenges by heightening oppression and limiting resilience. In the process, it will lessen Europe’s moral standing and the strength of its union.

Ministerial meeting on Libya (16 May 2016). Photo by European External Action Service.

Following the 2015 ‘migration crisis’, Europe has launched a series of extraordinary initiatives to stem the ‘migrant tide’. Most famous is its billion Euro Turkey deal. But even more elaborate and expensive are collaborations with governments (or those that claim to be) across North Africa to build African-based detention centres to hold would-be migrants. That is just one of many steps. Europe is also working hard to prevent migrants from ever even reaching the sea. To achieve this, Europe is empowering military regimes with undeniable disregard for human rights such as Omar Al Bashir’s Sudan. To themselves and the world, European leaders justify these actions with an elaborate apparatus of technocratic explanations about the universal benefits of ‘orderly’ migration. Intermittently, they also deliver low blows such as alleging that the discarded clothes of migrants pose a public health risk.

It dedicates billions of Euros to collecting migration data and improving border security. While the EU indefatigably assures us that these interventions will make migration ‘safer and better managed’, the primary goal is, undoubtedly, to limit movement northward. Yet global inequalities mean people will continue to move. And when they do so, European interventions make migrants far more violable, not safer. A few years ago, Pope Francis already called the Mediterranean ‘a vast cemetery’. In 2018 alone, more than 2100 people have died or are missingwhile attempting to cross the sea.

Whichever way it is looked at, not ‘managing’ migration is presented as a lose-lose scenario. Recognising the expense and limits of fortification alone, Europe now supports a growing range of initiatives intended to address ‘root causes’. The idea, as an agreement hashed out at a summit in Brussels in June 2018 put it, is to generate ‘substantial socio-economic transformation’. This includes tackling endemic poverty and fertility rates that outstrip African labour markets’ capacity to absorb. Taken together, these initiatives intend to bring about something that might best be characterised as ‘containment development.’ Under this rubric, developmental success becomes less about promoting human development as an end in itself. Instead, development becomes a means to prevent mobility.

Taken together, these initiatives intend to bring about something that might best be characterised as ‘containment development’

Some of what is envisaged by containment development initiatives – such as support for vocational training, reproductive health facilities, and other economic enterprise – will undoubtedly have positive effects on African lives. However, the approach also has multiple flaws that, if not addressed, will ultimately harm Africans and do little to ‘protect’ Europe from the perceived security and other threats migrants pose.

The first flaw is a fundamental misreading of African demography and the possibilities of creating the jobs needed to absorb surplus labour. Second, such approaches underestimate the potential of migration to be a mitigating effect against both economic and environmental precarity. Indicative of Europe’s containment development plans, the recently published German Marshall plan with Africathus argues that ‘it is vital that Africa’s young people can see a future for themselves in Africa.’ Third, by seeking to fragment African economic development into national rather than continental (or even global) supply chains and labour markets, people will be trapped in areas that are economically unviable. This will not only mean sustained poverty, but also intensify practices that further denude agricultural lands and forests. In either case, as is well documented, development is more likely to spur migration than stem it. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these plans ignore what is perhaps the most important limit on African development and human security: the state itself. The confinement of migrants to the status of ‘irregularity’ in the de facto absence of legal migration avenues is the singularly most significant obstacle to migrants’ safety and productivity.

The confinement of migrants to the status of ‘irregularity’ in the de facto absence of legal migration avenues is the singularly most significant obstacle to migrants’ safety and productivity

So far, European approaches have not worked, at least not in the way they are officially supposed to. Africans have not stopped coming. The ‘Turkey Deal’ has been more ‘successful’, in large part because of Turkey’s institutional capacity and the distance between its borders with Syria and the EU. By supporting police and militaries to close trans-Saharan migration routes, Europe is effectively bisecting the continent into north and south, putting a heavily militarized border across an invisible line that was previously permeable and largely unregulated. Yet if the United States’ experience on the Mexican border is anything to go by, enhanced border controls have limited effect on the numbers of people moving. Instead, they tend to generate increasingly elaborate mechanisms to subvert such controls.


Austrian chancellor (then minister) Sebastian Kurz attends the simulation of a border control mission on a FRONTEX vessel (24 March 2017). Photo by Dragon Tatic, Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres.

And this is what we already see. Across the Mediterranean, militarized borders have set off a kind of arms race between states and smugglers, with increasing collusion between the two. The Libyan slave marketsare the most notorious of examples, but within Sudan, Niger and elsewhere state and state-like authorities are forming profitable smuggling partnerships. The European military and security industryas well as international organisations implementing the EU’s migration management agenda benefit from ongoing ‘irregular’ migration and the threat supposedly emanating from it. Not only do they benefit, in more than one way they actively contribute to sustaining the ‘migration crisis’.

Throughout all this, Europe claims that its approach to governing migration is fundamentally ‘migrant-centred’and its relationship with Africa ‘characterised by equality and the pursuit of common objectives’.But Africans clearly don’t buy into the idea that their continent is about to brim with new opportunities or that Europe is working on their behalf. Indeed, Europe’s policies are almost entirely self-serving, adding to a long and appalling track record of Europeans furthering their interests under the guise of helping poor Africans. Europeans have previously found ways to justify abducting and enslaving Africans as the rescue of their heathen souls. Today, Europe pushes Africans out and back in the name of Africa’s development and progress. Tragically, European efforts to limit African mobility through coercion and containment development will ultimately save neither continent but only threaten lives in both Africa and Europe. That this is done with African leaders’ complicity truly makes this a lose-lose scenario.

About the authors

Loren B Landau is the South African Research Chair in Human Mobility and the Politics of Difference based at the University of the Witwatersrand’s African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS). A publically engaged scholar, his interdisciplinary work explores human mobility, community, and socio-political transformation.

Iriann Freemantle is an Associate Researcher with the African Centre for Migration & Society (ACMS) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. Over the past decade, Iriann has worked extensively on migration, xenophobia and social cohesion in South Africa. Her current work focuses on the role of the European Union and international organisations in the governance of mobility in Africa.

Recent publications

L.B. Landau. 2019. ‘A Chronotope of Containment Development: Europe’s Migrant Crisis and Africa’s Reterritorialization,’ Antipode 51(1):169-186. 

L.B. Landau and C.W. Kihato. 2019. ‘The Future of Mobility and Migration Within and From Sub-Saharan Africa,’ Foresight Reflection Paper. Brussels: European Policy Analysis and Strategy System.

African migration: Who’s thinking of going where?

By Josephine Appiah-Nyamekyeand and Edem Selormey

Despite the danger of dying of thirst in the Sahara desert, drowning in the Mediterranean, or being sold as slaves in Libya, many Africans are willing to risk their lives in search of greener pastures. Face-to-face interviews with thousands of Africans confirm this basic news-media narrative, as well as the perception that this gamble is particularly appealing to young and well-educated Africans looking for jobs and fleeing poverty. But they also point to important differences by country, including potential migrants’ preferred destinations, that can inform targeted policy responses.

Afrobarometer’s current round of nationally representative surveys (to be completed by mid-2018) explores migration intentions and drivers in 35 African countries. Initial data from nine countries – Ghana, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Mali, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – show that on average, one-third of respondents have considered emigrating, including 16% who have given it “a lot” of thought (see Figure 1). The proclivity to emigrate is highest in Malawi (where 28% say they have thought “a lot” about leaving), Zimbabwe (22%), Benin (20%), and Ghana (20%). It is lowest in Mali, where eight in 10 respondents (80%) say they have not considered emigrating at all.

Figure 1: Considered emigration| 9 African countries | 2016/2017

Figure 1

Respondents were asked: How much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live?

Among potential emigrants, two groups that are critical to African countries’ economic future are overrepresented – the young and the educated

Among potential emigrants, two groups that are critical to African countries’ economic future are overrepresented – the young and the educated. Africa has the youngest population in the world (according to the United Nations), but many young people are considering seeking their fortunes elsewhere. In each of the nine surveyed countries, younger respondents are more likely to have considered emigrating (Figure 2). One-fourth or more of 18- to 35-year-olds in Malawi (32%), Ghana (26%), and Benin (25%) say they have given “a lot” of thought to leaving their home countries (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Considered emigration “a lot” | by age group | 9 African countries              | 2016/2017

Figure 2

Respondents were asked: How much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live? (% who say “a lot”)

Similarly, educated respondents are more likely than their less-educated counterparts to consider emigrating. On average across the nine surveyed countries, one in four respondents with post-secondary qualifications (25%) say they have thought “a lot” about emigrating, compared to 20% of those with a secondary education, 13% with a primary education, and 8% without any formal education (Figure 3). The proportions are particularly large among post-secondary graduates in Malawi (40%) and Zimbabwe (32%) – two countries marked by high lived povertyand unemployment, and particularly vulnerable to the pernicious effects of brain drainas trained health-care workers, engineers, and other vital human resources opt for better opportunities abroad.

Figure 3: Considered emigration “a lot” | by education level | 9 African countries | 2016/2017

Figure 3

Respondents were asked: How much, if at all, have you considered moving to another country to live? (% who say “a lot”)

Given Africa’s high rates of poverty and unemployment, especially youth unemployment, it is hardly surprising that potential emigrants say they are motivated mainly by a desire to find a job (43%) and to escape economic hardship/poverty (33%) (Figure 4).

This is consistent with Africans’ perceptions of unemployment as their countries’ most important problem requiring government attention – a problem that is pushing energetic young human resources out of their home countries. But sadly, for many emigrants, a journey of hope often ends in despair or death; reports of hundreds of African emigrants captured, subjected to inhumane treatment, sometimes even sold as slaves sparked global outrage and became a key issue on the agenda of the November 2017 African Union-European Union Summit and a joint AU-EU-UN task force created to address the crisis.

Figure 4: Reasons for considering emigration| 9 countries | 2016/2017

Figure 4

Excluding those who said they had “not at all” considered emigration, respondents were asked: There are several reasons why people leave their home to live in another country for an extended period of time. What about you? What is the most important reason why you would consider moving from [your country]?

On average, although half of potential emigrants want to leave the continent, almost as many would prefer to go to another country within the same region or to another African country

While the drivers of potential emigration are fairly consistent across countries, preferred destinations vary greatly. On average, although half (51%) of potential emigrants want to leave the continent, almost as many would prefer to go to another country within the same region (37%) or to another African country (10%) (Figure 5). Among locations outside Africa, Europe (20%) and North America (19%) are the preferred destinations.

Another country in the same region is by far the most popular destination for potential emigrants in Malawi (71%), Zimbabwe (67%), Zambia (48%), and Benin (48%), but Europe and North America dominate emigration dreams in Côte d’Ivoire (45% and 28%, respectively) and Ghana (31% and 39%) (Table 1) – even if immigration barriers mean that only a fraction of these dreams are likely to be realized.

Figure 5: Preferred destination for potential emigrants| 9 African countries | 2016/2017

Figure 5

Excluding those who said they had “not at all” considered emigration, respondents were asked: If you were to move to another country, where would you be most likely to go?

Table 1: Preferred destination for potential emigrants| by country | 9 African countries | 2016/2017 

Within regionElsewhere in AfricaEuropeNorth AmericaCentral/ South AmericaMiddle EastAsiaAustralia
Malawi71%8%4%9%2%1%1%1%
Zimbabwe67%8%11%5%0%2%0%4%
Zambia48%16%11%13%2%2%5%
Benin48%9%19%10%2%1%1%1%
Uganda31%15%13%24%2%11%1%1%
Mali27%20%37%9%1%1%1%1%
Kenya26%6%14%31%3%10%1%4%
Côte d´Ivoire8%4%45%28%3%2%2%1%
Ghana7%4%31%39%2%2%2%2%
9-country average37%10%20%19%2%4%1%2%

Excluding those who said they had “not at all” considered emigration, respondents were asked: If you were to move to another country, where would you be most likely to go?

Migration tends to be economically beneficial for both countries of origin and receiving countries. Many industrial countries need migrants – who often provide relatively cheap labour –  to work in sectors such as information technology, health services, agriculture, manufacturing, and construction. Countries of origin benefit from remittances, which total about three times the amount of foreign aidthey receive. Despite these advantages, many governments are currently reluctant to receive immigrants, especially lower-skilled economic migrants without a claim to a humanitarian status. While several opinion polls have reported that a majority of Americans think that undocumented immigrants in the United States should be given a chance to remain there legally, some citizens and politicians – in the political center as well as the right and far right –  argue that immigrants compete with them for jobs and resources.

More in-depth analysis may point policy makers toward differences in drivers, destinations, and costs/benefits of migration that can help them align policies with realities in specific countries and regions

Against this backdrop, developed countries have taken recent steps to control migration, including proposing tighter rules on immigration in the United States and establishing the European Union Trust Fund to help curb extra-continental emigration from Africa.

For African leaders, the major challenge in preventing the depletion of human resources clearly lies in prioritizing the creation of thriving economies that generate jobs and improve the living conditions of young Africans. But more in-depth analysis of data from Afrobarometer and other sources may also point policy makers worldwide toward geographic and socio-demographic differences in drivers, destinations, and costs/benefits of migration that can help them align policies with realities in specific countries and regions.

About the authors

Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye is Afrobarometer communications coordinator for anglophone West Africa.

Edem Selormey is Afrobarometer field operations manager for anglophone West Africa and East and North Africa.

To follow Afrobarometer releases on migration and other issues, visit www.afrobarometer.org.

Photo by Gabriel Pecot for ODI

Can international frameworks or compacts reduce onward migration?

by Jessica Hagen-Zanker                                               Banner photo by Gabriel Pecot for ODI

Over the past few years, I, along with colleagues at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), have been researching how refugees and migrants make their migration decisions. This has led to new insights on how international policies, frameworks and Compacts shape these decisions.

Where do people want to migrate to?

Our findings show migration decisions are influenced by the broader public policy environment. People want to go where there are labour market opportunities, where their children can go to school, and where they feel welcome.

The majority of refugees and migrants don’t plan to come to Europe, at least initially. Most people go to neighbouring countries in the region first, hoping to find work and build a future there. Many of our interviewees told us that they prefer staying close to their country of origin, because of similarities in culture and language. Data analysed by the UN shows that 82% of African migrants stayed in Africa in 2013.

Gabriel Pecot for ODI
Daily life in Adi Harush refugee camp. Photo by Gabriel Pecot for ODI

But people move on when they’re unable to make a living, when their children are prevented from accessing school, and when their ambitions are not met. This came out very clearly in our research with Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. There, underlying labour constraints and mobility restrictions compelled many Eritreans to move on.

What is the role of Partnership Frameworks and Job Compacts?

People want access to jobs and basic services. If the aim of policy-makers is to reduce migration flows to Europe, the logical solution is to provide those services in the region where most migrants come from. This is where Partnership Frameworks and Job Compacts come in.

Ethiopia_AdIHarush__Ashmelas_03, edited
Photo by Gabriel Pecot for ODI

Building on the 2015 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, Migration Partnership Frameworks aim to reduce irregular migration by addressing its ‘root causes’, breaking up smuggling networks and strengthening borders. They do this through capacity building, return agreements, new legal migration channels, and new financing instruments, in target and origin countries such as Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

Similarly, Job Compacts aim to deal with protracted refugee situations by bringing together host country governments and bilateral and multilateral actors. To date, Compacts have been set up in Jordan, and proposed for Ethiopia. Building on existing economic, political, diplomatic and trade incentives, these Compacts establish mutually-reinforcing and binding financial and policy commitments. Such Compacts tend to involve a mix of development aid, loans and investment opportunities for target countries. They have multiple objectives:

  1. Give financial support to host countries to provide basic services;
  2. Foster economic development and job creation; and
  3. Stabilise host countries by reducing tensions between host and migrant populations.

At its most basic level, it’s aid to reduce onward migration.

On paper, they may look like win-win solutions. They appear to be a practical, politically viable and constructive way to support countries with large refugee and migrant populations, and provide access to needed jobs and basic services. In theory, therefore, such Frameworks and Compacts have the potential to reduce onward migration.

But do they work?

Our research in Jordan and Ethiopia shows that this potential depends on the Compacts’ design and delivery. Four issues could limit their success and/or create opportunities for policy-makers:

 1. Information and communication

Very little information on government policies actually filters down to people, which means that such information is less likely to feature in their decision-making. In Jordan, we found that people seem unaware of even the most basic details of the Job Compact, including which sectors are covered and the fact that work permits are subsidised in the first two years. In order for refugees and migrants to be able to make informed decisions about their future, information about the initiative should be transparent and accessible. Importantly, the Ethiopia Compact is intended to strengthen information sharing and communication.

Ethiopia_AdIArush__DailyLife_103, edited
Photo by Gabriel Pecot for ODI

 2. Assumptions about jobs

There are many assumptions underlying the decision to provide certain types of jobs. Firstly, that aid can create new jobs, and at a level high enough to make a difference. Many of these countries, such as Ethiopia, have been struggling with limited development and high un- and underemployment for years. Creating jobs isn’t going to be an easy or fast process.

Secondly, that the jobs created are the jobs people want. In Ethiopia, work permits will only be offered in factories in special economic zones; people may not be able to take advantage of their skills, or high levels of education. Often the jobs provided in factories don’t make people better off than irregular work in the informal economy, as shown by Chris Blattman and colleagues in a six year study of Ethiopian sweatshops. It also matters how these jobs are communicated, framed and perceived: is it decent work, or is the activity considered demeaning? Geography is also important: Syrian refugees in Jordan cite ‘factory location’ as a factor, with people not wanting to take on long travel times or be separated from their family.

Finally, that access to jobs reduces aspirations to move on. This will only happen if the jobs provided meet their expectations and skills.

 3. Social tensions

Opening up basic services may lead to overcrowding and lower quality services for the host population. In Kenya, the presence of Kakuma camp has contributed to a shortage of natural resources and another study showed overcrowded and deteriorating school quality in area part of Nairobi hosting a large refugee community. In a context where significant numbers of local people are also affected by poverty, vulnerability and unemployment, this could lead to a rise in social tensions. These Frameworks and Compacts therefore require sensitive management.

Gabriel Pecot for ODI
Photo by Gabriel Pecot for ODI

4. Confidence in government

Migration decisions are not just driven by economic factors, but also by confidence in government, rule of law and perceptions of security. Therefore, job creation might need to go hand in hand with governance and institution building.

Understanding the relationship between aid and migration

Experts agree that development aid will most likely increase migration, rather than reduce it. However, this relationship is far from clear-cut. Specific programmes, if designed and delivered well, may convince some people to stay in the region, but they can’t be assumed to have swift or immediate effects.

Specific programmes may convince some people to stay in the region, but this relationship is being used in simplistic ways for political gains

Yet this relationship is being used in simplistic ways for political gains, threatening the effective and appropriate implementation of aid. Furthermore, the emphasis of programming delivered as part of Partnership Frameworks so far has been on addressing irregular migration, including containment and control, much more than actually delivering development and alternative migration pathways.

Finally, we must remember that both aid and migration are important in their own right, contributing to holistic economic and social development. As such, it is vital that such Frameworks and Compacts draw out the development potential of migration, rather than trying to curb it.

Gabriel Pecot for ODI
Photo by Gabriel Pecot for ODI

About the author

Jessica Hagen-Zanker is a Research Fellow leading ODI’s migration research.

Jessica’s research has focused on understanding how migration and other policies affect migrant decision-making, impacts of migration on migrants and their families, the interlinkages between migration and social protection, and remittances, covering a diverse range of countries, including Albania, Ethiopia and Nepal. She also has extensive experience in the design and analysis of household surveys, conducting systematic literature reviews and the analysis of social protection programmes and policies. Jessica holds a PhD in Public Policy from Maastricht University.

Personal profile

Recent publications

Journeys to Europe: the role of policy in migrant decision-making. Research reports and studies. February 2016. Jessica Hagen-Zanker & Richard Mallett.